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So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any
other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Racism and hatred permeate the United States' immigration history.
From the Know-Nothing Party to California's Proposition 187, the U.S.
population manifests its hardships and fears in explicit racism. Despite
this truth, in the immigration context, the judiciary applies an extremely
lenient standard of review. This doctrine, called the plenary power doc-
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1. IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
32 (Thomas Kingsman Abbott trans., MacMillan 1985) (1785).
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trine, essentially abdicates judicial responsibility for the legislature and
executive branches' decisions to exclude aliens.
In few areas does Critical Race Theory (CRT) give as much insight as it
does in analyzing the plenary power doctrine? CRT encompasses the be-
lief that society, and not biology or some inherent, natural order, creates
racial and ethnic characteristics. Interestingly, this socially constructed
categorization reflects a balance of power where a select few "races"
dominate the other "races." This interplay of categories and domination
blossoms in immigration. For example, when in need of cheap labor, the
United States opens its border, either de jure or de facto. When the
economy struggles, the United States reacts with racist violence and
evicts, bars, and vilifies the aliens. CRT helps explain this American
phenomenon.
This Note argues that the judiciary's implementation of the plenary
power doctrine fails to reflect reality. Applying the tools of CRT and
focusing on immigration by Asians and Latinos,' this Note highlights the
historically discriminatory records of the United States' legislative and
the executive branches in immigration. Intriguingly, a pattern emerges.
The United States endorses minority immigration when economic exi-
gency exists. When the exigency dematerializes, racial tension explodes,
and the United States applies cruel and discriminatory laws to expel
humans who sacrificed much to work in the United States.
Then, this Note contrasts the racist, historical record with the constitu-
tional freedom that the courts grants the legislative and executive
branches. While the legislative and executive branches discriminate, the
courts idly stand by, rationalizing ways to give deference. But these ratio-
nalizations lack merit, have no link to reality, and rely on circular logic.
Due to these precarious foundations, this Note questions the value of
keeping the plenary power doctrine. Beyond this, however, this Note ar-
gues that CRT is critical to ending this abusive cycle.
Part II highlights the historical discrimination faced by Asian-Ameri-
cans and Latinos and, via the interest-convergence principle, explains the
increases in immigration and the backlashes that followed those in-
creases. Part II also explains the plenary power doctrine and exhibits
some of the doctrine's effects on aliens. Part III argues that the plenary
power doctrine lacks substance by highlighting the weakness of the ple-
nary power doctrine's rationale and explaining why any useful analysis of
immigration law needs CRT. Part IV concludes by offering a few possi-
ble remedies to the current tragedy created by the plenary power
doctrine.
2. For convenience, the term "Latino" describes both male and female Latinos and
Latinas.
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II. A NATION OF (MISTREATED) IMMIGRANTS
In the past, aliens in the United States faced nativist attitudes and dis-
criminatory laws. Employers urged a free-flow of cheap labor. These na-
tivist attitudes and discriminatory laws gave an avenue for frustrated
American laborers who saw their wages decline under competition from
aliens.3 The attitudes and laws further constrained aliens to the most me-
nial of jobs, protecting labor interests in better paying jobs. When the
employer no longer needed the cheap labor, business no longer at-
tempted to protect the free-flow of cheap labor, and the United States
government removed the aliens and closed paths to legal immigration.4
Notwithstanding this history, the Supreme Court abdicated any responsi-
bility over the actions taken by the political branches in immigration.
A. A Short Sample of Immigration History
By any account, the United States' treatment of aliens has been hide-
ous. By the standards of an allegedly liberal democracy, this treatment
has also been hypocritical. At best, one could call this treatment oppor-
tunistic. When the United States businesses needed cheap labor, the
United States government opened its arms to foreigners. Once the econ-
omy struggled, the United States' population and government attacked,
disgraced, and vilified those very same foreigners. Two periods in immi-
gration highlight this hideousness: (1) Chinese immigration in the 1800s;
and (2) the Bracero Program.
1. The Chinese, California, and the Exclusion Act
California only had 4000 Chinese aliens within its borders in 1850. 5 Af-
ter the California Gold Rush, Chinese aliens arrived in the United States
in considerable numbers.6 The California Gold Rush and the need for
laborers by railroads pulled Chinese aliens, and, at first, Californians wel-
3. But see generally JULIAN L. SIMON, How Do IMMIGRANTS AFFECT US ECONOMI-
CALLY? (1985) (arguing that immigration does not have a statistically significant effect on
aggregate employment and wages).
4. William F. Shugart II, Robert D. Tollison & Mwangi S. Kimenyi, The Political
Economy of Immigration Restrictions, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 79, 91 (1986) (finding that the
correlation of increased deportation of aliens during times of wage declines "supports the
theory that the immigration authorities use deportations to transfer wealth, mitigating
downward or upward pressure on wages").
5. WILLIAM L. TUNG, THE CHINESE IN AMERICA 1820-1973, at 8 (1974).
6. See ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA'S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE Ex-
CLUSION ERA, 1820-1943, at 25 (2003) (explaining how the racial hostilities, suffered by
Chinese immigrants, were the product of American Orientalist ideology).
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comed the Chinese aliens.7 "With the lack of labor generally, and espe-
cially the lack of women on the western frontier, [Chinese aliens] found
work in the mines, building the railroads, as ranch hands, farm laborers,
and domestic servants."' An ephemeral phenomenon, the welcome soon
dematerialized. Nonetheless, business interest and labor need pulled
Chinese aliens into the United States.
From the beginning, Chinese aliens faced discrimination. Even as early
as 1853, the California legislature passed protectionist measures against
the Chinese. For example, in 1853, the California legislature imposed a
tax on foreign miners. Of course, at the time, Chinese aliens constituted
the bulk of foreign miners.9 Similarly, in 1858, the California legislature
passed an act that barred further immigration by "Chinese or
Mongolians."'" And the judiciary, unwilling to give the legislature a mo-
nopoly on discrimination, also discriminated against the Chinese aliens.
The Supreme Court of California, in People v. Hall, held that the Chinese
could not testify against Whites." The defendant in Hall had murdered a
Chinese alien. Relying on the testimony of three Chinese witnesses, a
jury had found the defendant, Hall, guilty of murdering the Chinese
alien.' 2 The California Supreme Court held that the word "Black" under
a California statute that prevented Blacks from testifying against Whites
included Asians' 3 and overturned Hall's conviction. 4 Therefore, after
Hall, Whites could commit crimes against Chinese aliens with impunity,
since the Chinese aliens could not testify against the White aggressors.
Nevertheless, while nativist, these laws reflect more a restriction on
trade and a stabilization of labor force than an attempt to remove the
already-settled Chinese. By imposing a tax on foreign miners, the White
7. See MICHAEL C. LEMAY, GUARDING THE GATES: IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL
SECURITY 54 (2006).
8. Id.
9. WILLIAM L. TUNG, THE CHINESE IN AMERICA 1820-1973, at 8 (1974).
10. An Act To Prevent the Further Immigration of Chinese or Mongolians to the
State, ch. 529, 1858 Cal. Stat. 295 (repealed 1955); see WILLIAM L. TUNG, THE CHINESE IN
AMERICA 1820-1973, at 53 (1974).
11. 4 Cal. 399, 405 (1854). The Supreme Court of California, by restricting the ability
of Chinese to testify, did not wish to extend to Chinese "the further privilege of participat-
ing with [Whites] in administering the affairs of our government." Id.
12. John Copeland Nagle, The Worst Statutory Interpretation Case in History, 94 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1445, 1460 (2000) (book review). Hall appealed his conviction on grounds that
the three Chinese witnesses "were barred from testifying by the 1850 criminal proceedings
statute," despite not objecting to those witnesses' testimony at trial. Id.
13. Hall, 4 Cal. at 404 ("The word 'white' has a distinct signification, which ex vi ter-
mini, excludes black, yellow, and all other colors.").
14. See John Copeland Nagle, The Worst Statutory Interpretation Case in History, 94
Nw. U.L. REV. 1445, 1460 (2000) (book review) (outlining the court's reasoning in finding
that "Chinese are 'Indians' within the meaning of the [1850] statute").
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majority obtained dominance over the higher-paying jobs. Moreover, by
attempting to restrict immigration, the California legislature attempted to
keep the secondary labor force at its 1858 levels. The Hall opinion made
Chinese aliens second-class citizens, but the Chinese labor still existed for
use by the railroads.
Beyond governmental discrimination, however, Chinese aliens faced
violent actions by Americans. Twenty-one Chinese aliens died in an 1871
Los Angeles riot, and Denver was the site of an anti-Chinese riot in
1880.15 In Wyoming, a mob killed twenty-eight Chinese miners, and in
Tacoma, Washington, Whites drove hundreds of Chinese workers from
their homes.16 Still, despite the discrimination, violence, and hardship
and despite the American population's antipathy towards the Chinese
aliens, the United States government did not outlaw Chinese immigration
in the 1850s, 60s, or 70s. To answer why the United States government
never did so, one must first understand the interest-convergence
principle.
As originally formulated, the interest-convergence principle holds that
"[t]he interest of [B]lacks in achieving racial equality will be accommo-
dated only when it converges with the interests of [W]hites. '' 17 In the
immigration context, the principle can be restated to encompass the no-
tion that the United States will allow aliens to immigrate when necessary
to obtain cheap labor for the production of certain cheap goods. But, of
course, the principle does not stop there. The principle has a corollary:
When the necessity for cheap labor dissipates, the United States govern-
ment's open-gate policy dissipates as well. Moreover, because it benefits
business and the population that the cheap labor stay in dangerous and
low-paying jobs, the American population will discriminate, harass, and
vilify the alien population.18 By creating a second-class workforce, busi-
15. MICHAEL C. LEMAY, GUARDING THE GATES: IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL SE-
CURITY 56 (2006); Kris Song, Comment, The Present Contours of Asian American Legal
Scholarship: Its Themes, Objectives, and the Search for an Asian American Legal Perspec-
tive, 9 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 83, 91 (2004).
16. THOMAS A. ALIENIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 171 (5th ed. 2003); MICHAEL C. LEMAY, GUARDING THE GATES: IMMIGRATION
AND NATIONAL SECURITY 56 (2006).
17. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
18. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo/generous] Americanus: The
White Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1493, 1502
(1998) (showing that the American population has a designated set of values and looks
down on people that have yet to acquire the "American way," which usually ends up being
the immigrant population that is deemed as "different").
The White ethnic immigrant myth-that hard work, assimilation, and virtue can over-
come any adversity, including racism-has become the dominant American cultural
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nesses have a large supply of cheap labor. By allowing Whites to vilify
and attack aliens, the aliens take the venom created by class tensions.
Despite the violence and discrimination, by 1851, 25,000 Chinese aliens
lived in California, and another 13,000 Chinese aliens entered the United
States in 1854.19 The 1860 census estimated 34,933 Chinese living in the
United States,2° and, again, the need for labor dictated this immigration
pattern. Indeed, in 1865, the Central Pacific Railroad began recruiting
Chinese laborers. At first, the Central Pacific Railroad recruited the Chi-
nese laborers from California, but, eventually, the recruitment expanded
to Kwangtung, China.2' The Central Pacific Railroad, in fact, employed
nearly 9000 Chinese aliens a year.22 And, at the last stage of the con-
struction of the Central Pacific Railroad, "Chinese labor constituted
[ninety] percent of the working force.",23 Finally, between 1870 and 1880,
138,941 Chinese aliens entered the United States.24
Eventually, the Central Pacific Railroad no longer needed cheap labor,
and the United States government swiftly closed the gates. "[W]ith the
completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1869 and the economic de-
pression of 1873, pressure mounted on Congress to restrict immigra-
tion. This depression agitated Whites' fear of economic competition
from Chinese immigrant labor.26 Nativist agitation against the Chinese
aliens increased in the 1870s and 1880s.27
narrative. The White ethnic immigrant myth is hegemonic because it mandates assimi-
lation, dismisses the power and subordination dynamics of racism, demands conform-
ity with "American values," and ultimately constructs a racial/cultural binary that pits
the virtuous White assimilated ethnics against the nonvirtuous "raced" and the cultur-
ally different. Id.
19. WILLIAM L. TUNG, THE CHINESE IN AMERICA 1820-1973, at 8-9 (1974).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 11.
22. MICHAEL C. LEMAY, GUARDING THE GATES: IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL SE-
CURITY 54 (2006).
23. WILLIAM L. TUNG, THE CHINESE IN AMERICA 1820-1973, at 12 (1974).
24. ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA'S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE EXCLU-
SION ERA, 1820-1943, at 25 (2003) (discussing how Chinese immigration, particularly dur-
ing 1870 to 1880, compromised a small percentage of the total immigrant population
entering the United States). "Most came from the Pearl River delta region in Guangdong,
China, and, like the majority of newcomers to California, the Chinese community was com-
prised mostly of male laborers." Id.
25. Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The "Ple-
nary Power" Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 14
(2003) ("In 1882 legislation was passed suspending the immigration of new Chinese labor-
ers for ten years.").
26. See MICHAEL C. LEMAY, GUARDING THE GATES: IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL
SECURITY 55 (2006).
27. See BRIAN N. FRY, NATIVISM AND IMMIGRATION: REGULATING THE AMERICAN
DREAM 43 (2007) (contrasting American attitudes towards Chinese immigrants with their
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After the completion of the Central Pacific Railroad and after an eco-
nomic depression, the United States government reacted to the nativist
calls for limits on immigration. In 1875, Congress passed an act that lim-
ited the immigration of prostitutes.28 A seemingly respectable law, the
law ignominiously stereotyped all Chinese women as prostitutes.2 9 Fi-
nally, in 1882, because of "fear[s] of declining job opportunities for
Americans combined with racial and ethnic prejudice,"3 the United
States government barred any Chinese laborer from entering the United
States.31 Hence, once American businesses no longer needed a cheap
labor pool because of a stagnant economy, the United States responded
to what it had ignored for years-nativist sentiments. Once the economic
advantages of Chinese immigration disappeared, Chinese immigration
disappeared, too.
2. The Bracero Program and Labor Shortages
Similar to the story of the Chinese aliens in the 1800s, the Bracero Pro-
gram highlights the United States government's willingness to open the
immigration gate when the economy needed cheap labor and close the
immigration gate when economic necessity vanished. But, unlike the
story of Chinese aliens in the 1800s, the United States government di-
rectly controlled and shaped the Bracero Program.
attitudes against European immigrants during that time period). "[N]o 'variety of anti-
European sentiment has ever approached the violent extremes to which anti-Chinese agi-
tation went in the 1870's and 1880's."' Id. This notion was realized by legislation aimed at
preventing Chinese from coming to America and becoming United States citizens. Id.
"[I1n 1882 the Chinese Exclusion Act suspended almost all Chinese immigration and also
barred foreign-born Chinese from naturalizing, thereby creating the infamous category
'aliens ineligible for citizenship."' Id. Unfortunately, it was not until 1943 that the Act was
repealed due to the American alliance with China during World War II. Id.
28. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 3, 18 Stat. 477, 477.
29. NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION TO GUANTANAMO BAY: PLE-
NARY POWER AND THE PREROGATIVE STATE 17 (2007).
30. HELENE HAYES, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE UNDOCUMENTED 12 (2001).
31. Chinese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, 58-59 (1882).
Whereas, in the opinion of the Government of the United States the coming of Chi-
nese laborers to this country endangers the good order of certain localities within the
territory thereof: Therefore,
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, [t]hat from and after the expiration of ninety days
next after the passage of this act, and until the expiration of ten years next after the
passage of this act, the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States be, and the
same is hereby, suspended; and during such suspension it shall not be lawful for any
Chinese laborer to come, or, having so come after the expiration of said ninety days,
to remain within the United States. Id.
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In 1940, with a global war looming, California, Texas, and Arizona
farmers clamored over labor shortages. After the attack on Pearl Har-
bor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) listened.32 By
1942, the United States and Mexico had entered into an agreement,
under which Mexican agricultural laborers could work seasonally on
United States farms.33 This program lasted, on and off, until 1964 and
admitted four to five million Mexican workers.34 These Mexican laborers
"were the perfect exploitable underclass, willing to work for low wages
and in deplorable conditions."35
From the beginning, the Bracero Program "facilitated an uninterrupted
demand-based flow" of cheap labor.36 The program highlights the idea
that "business interests have frequently opposed immigration restrictions
and thus, at times, taken a position that may be described as pro-immi-
grant to ensure a cheap labor force.",3 7 To this business end, the Bracero
Program flourished. From 1942 to 1947, the Bracero Program allowed
200,000 Mexican aliens to enter the United States as agricultural work-
ers.3" Similarly, from 1948 to 1950, over 200,000 Mexican aliens legally
entered the United States as agricultural workers.39 At the same time,
400,000 Mexican aliens "illegally" entered the United States as agricul-
tural workers.4" Assuming that this wave of undocumented immigration
undermined the Bracero Program's success misjudges the power of eco-
nomic interests.
The illegal immigration of the Mexican laborers did not grow against
the Bracero Program, but instead grew as a supplement to the Bracero
Program. "[T]he increase in illegal immigration was.., encouraged by
32. See KiTrY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO Program, IMMIGRATION,
AND THE I.N.S. 18 (1992); HELENE HAYES, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE UNDOCU-
MENTED 29 (2001).
33. See RICHARD B. CRAIG, THE BRACERO PROGRAM: INTEREST GROUPS AND FOR-
EIGN POLICY 36-37 (1971) ("As a result of severe wartime labor shortages, the United
States concluded with Mexico on August 4, 1942, an intergovernmental agreement for the
use of Mexican agricultural labor on United States farms.").
34. HELENE HAYES, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE UNDOCUMENTED 29 (2001).
35. Ruben J. Garcia, Comment, Critical Race Theory and Proposition 187: The Racial
Politics of Immigration Law, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 118, 127 (1995).
36. RICHARD B. CRAIG, THE BRACERO PROGRAM: INTEREST GROUPS AND FOREIGN
POLICY 7 (1971).
37. Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in
the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 525,
544.
38. RICHARD B. CRAIG, THE BRACERO PROGRAM: INTEREST GROUPS AND FOREIGN
POLICY 50 (1971). Although these farm workers were located in twenty-four states, the
"vast majority [were] employed in California." Id.
39. Id. at 63.
40. Id.
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INS enforcement policies."41 Whenever INS officials attempted to de-
port undocumented Mexican agricultural workers, farmers protested.42
One example highlights the INS's complicity in illegal immigration. A
large number of Mexicans arrived in Juarez, Mexico with the hopes of
becoming agricultural workers in the United States. Mexico refused to
allow the Mexicans into the Bracero Program, and the INS, under pres-
sure by Texas cotton farmers, opened the gates and allowed the Mexi-
cans, "illegally," into the United States.43 Indeed, the illegal immigration
of Mexican workers became an easier administrative tool for granting
farmers cheap labor.
The Bracero Program always consisted of two administrative tools: the
bureaucratic, legal system and the surreptitious, illegal system. Both
played a critical part, and both helped feed farmers' cheap-labor needs.
Thus, by 1950, 67,500 Mexicans had entered the United States via the
Bracero Program, and 458,215 Mexicans had entered illegally.44 The
numbers increased in 1952, with 197,000 Mexican agricultural laborers
entering through the Bracero Program, and 543,538 Mexican agricultural
laborers entering illegally.45 By 1954, the numbers stood at 309,033 Mexi-
can agricultural laborers entering by the Bracero Program, and 1,075,168
Mexican agricultural laborers entering illegally.46 The INS finally began
to restrict illegal immigration.
Some scholars believe that the INS responded to the high number of
undocumented aliens.47 But, the INS's response resulted not from the
number of undocumented aliens but from economic interest. For exam-
ple, the INS implemented a program with an unbelievable name, Opera-
41. Ki'Y CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION,
AND THE I.N.S. 32 (1992).
42. Id. at 35.
43. RICHARD B. CRAIG, THE BRACERO PROGRAM: INTEREST GROUPS AND FOREIGN
POLICY 69 (1971). During this tense situation, the INS eventually opened the gates for
three days and allowed over 4000 undocumented immigrants to enter after receiving pres-
sure from Texas employers, who were waiting to transport these individuals to cotton
fields. Id.
44. Id. at 125-26.
45. Id. at 126.
46. Id. ("In 1952, the comparative figures were 197,000 braceros and 543,538 [undocu-
mented individuals]. In 1953, the figures were 201,380 and 875,318. By 1954, the figures
had become fantastic: 309,033 braceros and 1,075,168 known [undocumented
individuals].")
47. See, e.g., id. at 126-27 (describing the ever increasing illegal immigrants situation
in the early 1950s and its effect on both countries). Specifically, the United States and
Mexico blamed each other for the tide of immigrants while others complained of the nega-
tive side effects of mass illegal migration. Id. These growing concerns and issues helped
push a "call to action" in 1954. Id.
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tion Wetback, in 1954.48 The program intended to remove the
undocumented Mexican laborers. 49 Operation Wetback might seem in-
consistent with the agricultural need for cheap labor, but closer examina-
tion shows differently. The number of legal Mexican agricultural laborers
who entered the United States through the Bracero Program increased
during Operation Wetback. ° In reality, Operation Wetback merely
shifted the work force from one based mainly on undocumented Mexican
laborers to legal Mexican laborers. And the reason for this shift again
accords with the interest-convergence principle and its corollary.
"The long hours, sporadic employment, and arduous working condi-
tions of agricultural production made the retention of workers problem-
atic."5" As the number of undocumented Mexican laborers increased, so
did the mobility of the work force. An undocumented Mexican laborer
had no need to stay on any farm and could, instead, attempt to find the
best farm to work on. In contrast, the Bracero Program confined a legal
Mexican laborer to a specific employer.52 Hence, by channeling Mexican
laborers through mediums that required them to stay on specific farms,
Operation Wetback actually cheapened the labor available to farmers.
After Operation Wetback, Mexican laborers could not move to a better,
higher-paying job.53 Instead, like the restrictions placed on Chinese
aliens in the 1800s, Operation Wetback limited Mexican laborers to un-
safe, arduous, and low-paying jobs. Moreover, "[i]f [Mexican laborers]
could be counted on at the moment of need and could be coerced not to
'skip,' this highly regulated supply of labor had the additional advantage
that once the need had subsided, the workers could be sent home."5 4
Therefore, Operation Wetback followed the needs and concerns of agri-
cultural business. Actually, although farmers had repeatedly complained
about prior INS attempts to remove undocumented Mexican laborers,
farmers acclaimed Operation Wetback. 5
48. See RICHARD B. CRAIG, THE BRACERO PROGRAM: INTEREST GROUPS AND FOR-
EIGN POLICY 127-28 (1971) (stating that the "call to action" came in 1954 and the opera-
tion was titled "Operation Wetback" and General Swing had "full authority" over the
operation).
49. Id. at 128.
50. See Ki'rY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRA-
TION, AND THE I.N.S. 55 (1992).
51. Id. at 56.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 74 ("[U]sing workers whose legal status was contingent on their staying
with one employer would reduce the turnover of workers attracted to better wages or
working conditions elsewhere, and ultimately stabilize or even reduce labor costs.").
54. Id. at 58.
55. See KIrT CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRA-
TION, AND THE I.N.S. 59 (1992).
[Vol. 11:341
CRITICAL RACE THEORY
Of course, if the INS did not bring enough legal Mexican laborers into
the United States, the labor pool would shrink. Consequently, labor
prices would increase, defeating the goal of the Bracero Program. As
such, INS reports after Operation Wetback show incredibly detailed cal-
culations on the supply and demand of agricultural labor.5 6 This, of
course, follows from the INS's attempts to tailor immigration policy to
follow agricultural needs.
Eventually, the program ceased to exist. But, again, the interests con-
trolling the end of the program emerge from farmers' interests. For in-
stance, in 1951, machinery harvested only eight percent of cotton crops.57
In contrast, the year the Bracero Program ended, machinery harvested
seventy-eight percent of cotton crops.58 In essence, the Bracero Program
died when farmers no longer needed a large, governmentally adminis-
tered, Mexican-laborer program. Once the farmers' interests no longer
coincided with Mexican aliens' needs, the United States government uni-
laterally ignored Mexican aliens' needs.
B. The Plenary Power Doctrine: Fictional Sovereignty
The plenary power doctrine's birth underscores the racism that perme-
ates its application. The plenary power doctrine states "that in ... immi-
gration law the courts will not intervene because Congress and the
executive ... have complete power."59 "[W]hen the plenary power doc-
trine is invoked, the courts will not intervene to enforce otherwise appli-
cable guarantees of the Constitution. "'6 The Chinese Exclusion Case6 '
gave birth to the plenary power doctrine. Essentially, the Chinese Exclu-
sion Case concerns outright discrimination, which the Supreme Court it-
self concedes.62 In the Chinese Exclusion Case, a Chinese laborer who
had lived for roughly twelve years in San Francisco, traveled to China
with a certificate that entitled him to enter the United States.6 3 In his
56. See id. at 82.
57. Id. at 143.
58. Id. at 144.
59. Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The "Ple-
nary Power" Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 14
(2003).
60. NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION TO GUANTANAMO BAY: PLE-
NARY POWER AND THE PREROGATIVE STATE 5 (2007).
61. 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
62. Id. at 603 (intimating that, though the so-called Chinese Exclusion Act and its
amendments, excluding all Chinese workers from entering or re-entering the United States
for a period of ten years on penalty of imprisonment and/or deportation, is a lawful exer-
cise of Congress's constitutional power to control immigration, it may not be a moral exer-
cise of that power).
63. Id. at 582.
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absence, the United States had passed the racist Chinese Exclusion Act,'
which barred the entrance of Chinese laborers into the United States,
notwithstanding any certificate in the Chinese laborers' possessions.65
Hence, when the Chinese alien attempted to reenter the United States,
the United States prevented his admission.66
The Court took this factual situation to ask the following: "There being
nothing in the treaties between China and the United States to impair the
validity of the act of Congress of October 1, 1888, was it on any other
ground beyond the competency of Congress to pass it? ' ' 67 The question
sounds innocuous, but, in reality, the Court asked whether Congress vio-
lated the Constitution by passing the Chinese Exclusion Act.
The Court held that, although the federal government cannot deprive
"any person ... of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,",68
the exclusion decisions of the legislative branch bound the judiciary.69
However, the Supreme Court itself recognizes the racist rationale be-
hind the Chinese Exclusion Act, and, in fact, the legislative history of the
Act could lead to no other conclusion but that Congress based the Act on
racial animus. In the legislative history, Senators and Representatives de-
scribed Chinese aliens as incapable of assimilating, as causing moral deg-
radation, as incapable of appreciating freedom, and as stealing spots from
"honest" White aliens.7 ° The Court followed Congress's lead.
The Court first recognized that the Chinese migrated to the United
States, usually under contract, for employers "for whose benefit they
worked.",71 The Court recognized the aliens' diligence.72 Nonetheless,
the cheap, diligent labor irritated Americans, and, to state it as euphemis-
64. Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888) (excluding people from China
from the United States).
[F]rom and after the passage of this act, it shall be unlawful for any [C]hinese laborer
who shall at any time heretofore have been, or who may now or hereafter be, a resi-
dent within the United States, and who shall have departed, or shall depart, there-
from, and shall not have returned before the passage of this act, to return to, or
remain in, the United States. Id. at 504.
65. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 599 (quoting the text of the amended Chinese
Exclusion Act).
66. Id. at 589 (describing Ping's arrival at the Port of San Francisco, where he was
refused entry solely based on the amendment to the Chinese Exclusion Act and later de-
tained by the captain of the steam ship on which he arrived).
67. Id. at 603.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
69. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606.
70. Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Con-
stitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1, 28, 29 n.155, 30 (1998).
71. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 594. The first wave of immigrants readily
found gainful employment, worked in various industries for low wages, and was generally
unopposed by Americans. Id. However, as more Chinese arrived and began replacing
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tically as the Court did, "[t]he differences of race added greatly to the
difficulties of the situation."73 The Court, unwilling to simply describe
the xenophobic, racist nature of the population, partook in the racism.
For the Court, the Chinese would overrun the United States and "re-
mained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, and adhering
to the customs and usages of their own country.",
7
"
In the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court never hid the true reasons
behind the immigration bar on Chinese laborers. Nonetheless, the Court
understood that blatant racism could not solely underlie the rationale of
the plenary power doctrine. Because of this realization, the Court looked
to sovereignty, national security, and self-definition of the political
community.
The Court first noted that every independent nation has "[j]urisdiction
over its own territory., 75 The United States is an independent nation.
Therefore, the United States has complete jurisdiction over its territory,
including the power to bar certain races from entering the United
States.76 Next, the Court pointed to national security. "To preserve its
independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroach-
ment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly
all other considerations are to be subordinated., 77 An arguably legiti-
mate reason, this rationale ignores the lack of a security concern in the
Chinese Exclusion Case. Finally, the Court reasoned that every commu-
American workers in mechanical jobs, hostilities between the immigrants and natives grew,
causing open conflicts and disturbances of the public peace. Id. at 594-95.
72. Id. at 595. The Court mentioned that the Chinese "were generally industrious and
frugal. Id. "Not being accompanied by families, except in rare instances, their expenses
were small; and they were content with the simplest fare, such as would not suffice for our
laborers and artisans." Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 603.
As they grew in numbers each year, the people of the coast saw, or believed they saw,
in the facility of immigration, and in the crowded millions of China, where population
presses upon the means of subsistence, great danger that at no distant day that portion
of our country would be overrun by them, unless prompt action was taken to restrict
their immigration. Id.
75. Id. at 603.
76. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603 ("That the government of the United
States, through the actions of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its terri-
tory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy.").
77. Id. at 606 (asserting that whether defending against invasion by a foreign country
or "vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us," the federal government is charged with
defending its territorial sovereignty).
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nity has the right to self-definition; every community could define itself
and bar others from entering the community.78
While one might view the plenary power doctrine as a racist outlier, the
Court gleefully expanded the plenary power doctrine following the Chi-
nese Exclusion Case. For example, the Court has now stated that "over
no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more com-
plete than it is over the admission of aliens."' 79 Indeed, the Court has
reaffirmed the plenary power doctrine in several cases.8 ° For instance, in
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, the Court held that, if an alien had never
entered the United States, an alien's procedural due process rights
equaled those rights granted by Congress or the Executive.81 Similarly in
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, the Court upheld the govern-
ment's indefinite detention of an alien in Ellis Island 82-this despite the
alien's twenty-five-year residence in the United States, his departure be-
ing due to his need to see his dying mother, and the unwillingness of any
other nation to take in the alien.83 The travesties of this doctrine are
numerous. One scholar poignantly stated, "Chinese Exclusion-its very
name is an embarrassment-must go."8' Yet, the Chinese Exclusion case
remains.
III. THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE FALLACY
Three reasons drove the Court's decision in the Chinese Exclusion
Case. First, the Court relied on the government's sovereign powers. "Ju-
78. Id. at 607 (discussing an historical acceptance of a nation's right to define its
citizenry).
79. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co.
v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)
("Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sov-
ereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from
judicial control."); Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1909) (reaffirming that
Congress "has the power to exclude aliens," "to prescribe the terms and conditions on
which they may come in," and establish regulations on sending them out); Fok Yung Yo v.
United States, 185 U.S. 296, 302 (1902) (holding that the doctrine of Congress's "power to
exclude or expel aliens" is firmly established); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651, 659-60 (1892) (stating that the "supervision of the admission of aliens into the United
States may be entrusted to Congress").
81. See Nishimura Ekiu 142 U.S. at 660.
82. Shaughnessy, 345, U.S. at 215.
83. Id. at 218-19. "After a foreign visit to his aged and ailing mother that was pro-
longed by disturbed conditions of Eastern Europe, he obtained a visa for admission issued
by our consul and returned to New York." Id. at 219.
84. Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chi-
nese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 863 (1987) (observing an apparent
unjust system of deterring immigrants from entering the United States).
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risdiction over its own territory to [limit immigration] is an incident of
every independent nation."8 5 Second, because of the security risks inher-
ent in immigration, the Court has refused to overturn immigration deter-
minations made by the political branches.8 6 Third, for the Court,
members of the American political community can decide who else may
join the American political community.87 This portion of the Note at-
tacks these reasons under a doctrinal lens and explains why any solution
to abuses faced by aliens should incorporate CRT.
A. Doctrinally Unsound
First, the Court created the inherency-of-sovereignty argument from
scratch. Although independent nations have jurisdiction over immigra-
tion, "[i]t is not obvious ... that ... in our federal state, control of immi-
gration is a power lodged in the federal government., 88 Indeed, "[a]ll
powers of government, all police powers, are inherent in nationhood, in
sovereignty, but in our constitutional system most of them were not dele-
gated to the federal government., 89  More importantly, however, the
Court itself recognizes that international law begets the sovereign's ple-
nary power over immigration.9 ° Here, the Supreme Court's rationale
crumbles.
International law limits sovereignty. "[W]hat is sovereignty, if not a
mutual recognition by states and nations of their right to control certain
matters within their jurisdiction?"'" Yet, international law grants specific
85. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603; see also Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659
("It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power,
as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of for-
eigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions
as it may see fit to prescribe.").
86. See Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606 (asserting that, if Congress concludes
the presence of aliens in the United States, particularly those aliens who are of a different
race and disinclined to assimilate, poses a threat to domestic peace and security, the judici-
ary is bound by that decision).
87. See id. at 605 (describing how the government formed for and by the people must,
at the people's direction, regulate the admission of foreigners). "The people have declared
that in the exercise of all powers given for these objects [the federal government] is su-
preme. It can, then, in effecting those objects, legitimately control all individuals or gov-
ernments within the American territory." Id.
88. Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chi-
nese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REv. 853, 857 (1987).
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659 (reminding us that the Constitution has
vested this power to the national government to control international relations).
91. Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The "Ple-
nary Power" Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 14
(2003) (arguing that true sovereignty is acquired by the interactions between states and
2009]
THE SCHOLAR
rights to aliens.92 For example, aliens have rights against arbitrary deten-
tion.9 3 Hence, international law would constrain the United States' sov-
ereignty and prevent it from repeating Shaughnessy. But, here, one
would err.
While the Supreme Court has yet to address whether current interna-
tional law limits the plenary power doctrine, detained aliens have taken
this argument to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In Garcia-Mir v.
Meese, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument that
international law could constrain the Executive's disregard for due pro-
cess.9 4 Other courts have rejected similar arguments.95
Garcia-Mir concerned the detention of Cubans who had departed from
Cuba's Mariel Harbor.96 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had pre-
viously, in Jean v. Nelson, held that the Attorney General had authority
"to discriminate on the basis of national origin in making parole deci-
sions," 97 and denied that any constitutional principle prevented the gov-
ernment from detaining Haitians indefinitely.98 Because cases like Jean
and Shaughnessy barred the aliens from arguing that indefinite detention
violated the Constitution, the Cubans that the government held indefi-
nitely in Garcia-Mir had to make extraconstitutional arguments.
Noting that international law forbids arbitrary detention, the Cubans
argued that the government could not indefinitely detain them.99 But the
court dismissed the argument. The Eleventh Circuit stated, "[T]he reach
outside this context there is no legitimate meaning). "[T]he Supreme Court's justification
for the exercise of plenary power is that the power is inherent in sovereignty." Id.
92. See id. (showing that although international law prohibits states from discriminat-
ing based on national origin or race, the current immigration law that the United States
enforces violates this provision).
93. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, open for signature Dec.
16, 1966, art. 9, 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), available at http://
www.unhchr.chlhtml/menu3/b/a-ccpr.htm ("Everyone has the right to liberty and security
of person.").
94. 788 F.2d 1446, 1454-55 (11th Cir. 1986).
95. See, e.g., Oliva v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 433 F.3d 229, 230, 235-36 (2d Cir. 2005)
(discussing that, because explicit congressional action will trump customary international
law, the court need not reach the merits of petitioner's claim for relief from removal from
the United States as an "adult nonpermanent resident alien"); Gisbert v. U.S. Att'y Gen.,
988 F.2d 1437, 1448 (5th Cir. 1993) (instructing that "because federal executive, legislative,
and judicial actions supersede the application of [the] principles of international law" at
issue, petitioners had no foundation on which to base their unlawful incarceration
contentions).
96. Mark D. Kemple, Note, Legal Fictions Mask Human Suffering: The Detention of
the Mariel Cubans Constitutional, Statutory, International Law, and Human Considerations,
62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1733, 1792 (1989).
97. 727 F.2d 957, 963 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), affd as modified, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
98. Id. at 975.
99. Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1453.
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of international law will be interdicted by a controlling judicial deci-
sion. '' "° The court continued, "In Jean v. Nelson, we [held] ... that even
an indefinitely incarcerated alien 'could not challenge his continued de-
tention without a hearing."'"" 1 Thus, international law could not override
the court's decision in Jean, which held that aliens held indefinitely by the
government had no constitutional right to a hearing. Supreme Court pre-
cedent and Jean trumped international law, and the aliens had no
recourse.
But, of course, the Nishimura Ekiu, Jean, and all other plenary power
cases rely on the Chinese Exclusion Case, which relies on international
law's recognition that sovereignty grants nations control over their bor-
ders. Relying on international law in the 1800s, the Court in the Chinese
Exclusion Case held that the political branches have plenary power over
immigration. The Court, then, pronounced a rule of law based on inter-
national law from the 1800s. Because it pronounced this now anachronis-
tic rule, the courts now refuse to accept current international law, which
curbs the political branches' plenary power.1
0 2
This argument's circularity undermines any notion that the interna-
tional-law/sovereignty argument demands the plenary power doctrine.
By all reason, if international law created the plenary power doctrine,
international law should define the scope of the plenary power doctrine.
Had the Supreme Court, in the Chinese Exclusion Case, Nishimura Ekiu,
or some other immigration case, rejected the plenary power doctrine, be-
cause the Constitution limits federal agents wherever they be or because
the Fifth Amendment applies to all persons, including aliens, 0 3 the Court
100. Id. at 1455.
101. Id.
102. The logic here shadows the circular logic mentioned in Felix S. Cohen, Transcen-
dental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
The current legal argument runs: One who by the ingenuity of his advertising or the
quality of his product has induced consumer responsiveness to a particular name, sym-
bol, form of packaging, etc., has thereby created a thing of value; a thing of value is
property; the creator of property is entitled to protection against third parties who
seek to deprive him of his property....
The vicious circle inherent in this reasoning is plain. It purports to base legal protec-
tion upon economic value, when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic value of a
sales device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally protected. If commer-
cial exploitation of the world "Palmolive" is not restricted to a single firm, the word
will be of no more economic value to any particular firm than a convenient size, shape,
mode of packing, or manner of advertising, common in the trade. Not being of eco-
nomic value to any particular firm, the word would be regarded by courts as "not
property," and no injunction would be issued. Id. at 815.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The text states that "[n]o person shall.., be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id. (emphasis added).
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would have debunked the international law argument. Instead, the gov-
ernment indefinitely holds aliens because of an ancient norm. Having
originally relied on international law, the courts should now look to inter-
national law to define the plenary power doctrine's scope.
Second, the security argument lacks all merit. As a practical matter, no
tangible security interest existed in the Chinese Exclusion Case. The
Court attempted to make a national security case by stating, "It matters
not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from
the foreign nation acting in its national character or from vast hordes of
its people crowding in upon us."1°4 This argument lacks merit. At this
time, the great majority of immigrants to the United States came from
Europe.10 5 Yet, the Chinese Exclusion Act excluded only the Chinese.
No "vast hordes" intended to invade the United States. Nevertheless,
Congress excluded Asians, not Europeans, and the Court's language re-
flects more the racist attitudes of many Whites than it does a national
security threat.
10 6
Circuit courts and the government, in their attempts to bolster the ple-
nary power doctrine, have created a dictator hypothetical, whereby an
evil dictator decides to open her border and, because the plenary power
doctrine does not exist, forces the United States to incorporate all of the
dictator's exiles. 10 7 For numerous reasons, the government's argument
fails.
104. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606.
105. MICHAEL C. LEMAY, GUARDING THE GATES: IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL SE-
CURITY 40 fig.2.1 (2006).
106. See Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606 (describing large-scale immigration
of Chinese as an invasion of "vast hordes" of a foreign people "crowding in upon"
Americans).
If... the government of the United States... considers the presence of foreigners of a
different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its
peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no
actual hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are subject. Id. (emphasis
added).
Indeed, as Professor Natsu Taylor Saito has noted, this security rationale implicitly assumes
"that the citizenry need not worry about ... this exercise of unlimited power [by the politi-
cal branches] because Americans are protected by such actions." Natsu Taylor Saito, Be-
yond the Citizen/Alien Dichotomy: Liberty, Security, and the Exercise of Plenary Power, 14
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 389, 401 (2005). Saito, however, finds this argument to be
"patently false," unless the definition of who is considered an "American" is confined to
not only citizenship, "but by race, religion, national origin, economic class, and a willing-
ness to support the status quo." Id.
107. See, e.g., Jean, 727 F.2d at 975 ("A foreign leader could eventually compel us to
grant physical admission via parole to any aliens he wished by the simple expedient of
sending them here and then refusing to take them back."); Chavez-Rivas v. Olsen, 207 F.
Supp. 2d 326, 338 (D.N.J. 2002) ("Without continuing detention, the INS claims, overseas
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Initially, the hypothetical seems unrealistic. For the hypothetical to
work, the despot must control a nearby government. The President of
North Korea, Kim Jong-il, for example, could never try such a ploy. The
hypothetical mass exodus would have no means of reaching the United
States from North Korea. This leaves a handful of nations whereby this
scenario can work: Canada, Mexico, Haiti, Cuba, and the Dominican Re-
public. It seems unlikely that these countries would undergo a campaign
to topple the United States government through immigration. Addition-
ally, an incentive already exists for despots to send huge waves of aliens
to the United States: It costs $30,000 per year to indefinitely detain an
alien.10
8
Lastly, a despot likely would not care whether the United States has a
benevolent, malevolent, or neutral policy.1"9 The notion that a rogue dic-
tator would only release citizens she no longer wanted only when the
United States has a humane policy internally contradicts itself. The dicta-
tor, evil enough to expel numerous people, lacks the wickedness to do so
when the United States would treat the exodus members inhumanely.
While the Court's national security reasoning in the Chinese Exclusion
Case seems weak, national security, abstractly, exists as a plausible ratio-
nale. However, doctrinally, the national security rationale fails to over-
come the need for constitutional protection. For instance, in the realm of
military matters, the courts give the political branches a latitude similar to
the latitude they give the political branches in immigration matters. "Al-
though 'military necessity' rather than the plenary power doctrine is usu-
ally invoked, the powers claimed by the government and the courts'
rationale for refusing to impose otherwise applicable constitutional limi-
tations are virtually identical."1 1 0 Yet, the Supreme Court has recently
upheld constitutional limits upon the political branches even in times of
military necessity.
For example, after September 11, 2001, the United States considers it-
self to be at war with terrorism. As part of this effort, the United States
imprisoned 700 men in Guantdinamo Bay, Cuba."l ' The United States
dictators would use the United States as dumping ground for their criminals and
malcontents.").
108. See Eliot Walker, Note, Safe Harbor: Is Clark v. Martinez the End of the Voyage
of the Mariel?, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 121, 156 (2006) (considering the government's public
policy argument that relaxing U.S. immigration policy would provide an incentive for
rogue nations to dump their undesired citizens into the United States).
109. Id.
110. NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION TO GUANTANAMO BAY: PLE-
NARY POWER AND THE PREROGATIVE STATE 51 (2007).
111. Id. at 160.
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brought these men to Cuba while blindfolded, shackled, and drugged." 2
Though the United States has a prima facie valid reason for arresting and
detaining these men-these men allegedly compose terrorists of the high-
est order-and although terrorists have attacked the United States, the
Supreme Court has found the indefinite detention of these men troubling.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that "due process de-
mands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be
given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that deten-
tion before a neutral decisionmaker.""' 3 Applying the Mathews v. El-
dridge114 due process balancing test, the Court required that citizens
receive notice and a fair hearing to rebut the government's claims.115 But
what about military necessity? "[A] state of war is not a blank check
",116
Similarly, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court upheld an enemy combat-
ant's challenge to President Bush's attempts to prosecute him via a mili-
tary commission.17 Despite the government's claim that Hamdan
committed conspiracy and that courts should await the outcomes of on
going military trials, the Court considered the merits of Hamdan's chal-
lenge. 18 Notably, the Court assumed the truth of the charges against
Hamdan and assumed that Hamdan constituted a dangerous individ-
ual. 19 Still, the Court held that the military commission created by the
Executive could not hold trial against Hamdan. 1
20
Finally, Boumediene v. Bush concerned aliens categorized as enemy
combatants. 121 Unlike Hamdan and Hamdi, Boumediene concerned not
just the executive branch's wartime power but concerned the legislative
branch's power as well. Congress passed a law that restricted the de-
tained aliens' ability to seek judicial review.' 22 The law, the Court ac-
knowledged, denied courts jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions
made by the detained aliens. 123 Yet, the Court first indicated that the
geographical limits of the United States do not limit the Constitution.
112. Id.
113. 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
114. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
115. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
116. Id. at 536.
117. 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006).
118. Id. at 584-85 (describing the Court's decision to review Hamdan's case despite
the President's request to wait until other Guantanamo Bay cases were heard).
119. Id. at 635 (focusing on the Court's acceptance of the President's claim that
Hamdan was a dangerous person).
120. Id. at 613.
121. 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2242.
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Instead, the Constitution follows U.S. officials.1 24 Then, the Court found
Congress's substituted procedures an inadequate substitute for the writ of
habeas corpus.1 25
Hamdi, Hamdan, and Boumediene represent three instances where the
Court imposed its will upon the political branches notwithstanding the
national security interests involved. While national security interests ex-
isted, the Court used lofty language to demolish the national security in-
terests and revere the liberty interests involved. For Justice O'Connor,
"[i]t is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Na-
tion's commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in
those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the princi-
ples for which we fight abroad., 126 Boumediene contained its own lofty
rhetoric to dismiss the national security interests invoked by the political
branches. "Security subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom's first principles.
Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and
the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of
powers." '12 7 The Court continued, "The laws and Constitution are de-
signed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times.'
128
The Court's ability to apply constitutional principles when actual
threats might exist but to rebuke the application of those very same con-
stitutional principles when no actual threat exists causes alarm.'
29 If
courts can balance the national security interests on the war on terror,
they can a fortiori balance national security interests when cases involve
no concrete national security interests. 3 °
124. Id. at 2254-55.
[T]he real issue in the Insular Cases was not whether the Constitution extended to
the Philippines or Porto Rico when we went there, but which ones of its provisions
were applicable by way of limitation upon the exercise of the executive and legislative
power in dealing with new conditions and requirements. Id. (quoting Balzac, 258 U.S.
at 312).
"The Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and
govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its terms apply." Id. at 2259.
125. Id. at 2240.
126. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532.
127. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277.
128. Id.
129. A similar argument has been made comparing the foreign affairs power to the
plenary power doctrine. See, e.g., Richard F. Hahn, Note, Constitutional Limits on the
Power To Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 957, 973-74 (1982) (comparing the Court's
willingness to apply the Constitution to the government in foreign affair-power cases with
its unwillingness to apply the Constitution in plenary power cases).
130. A stark difference exists in the Court's willingness to look beyond its deference
in these two contexts. A possible explanation resides in the history of the doctrines.
Though people attack cases like the Chinese Exclusion Case, which concerns the plenary
power doctrine, and cases like Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which con-
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Third, the Court's reliance on a community's ability to define itself
begs the question. For instance, in the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court
noted, "Every society possesses the undoubted right to determine who
shall compose its members, and it is exercised by all nations, both in
peace and war."'131 Even assuming that a society can select what mem-
bers enter, and what members cannot enter, the political community,
132
this rationale ignores that the U.S. community has already created a
framework within which it can act.
The Constitution is the U.S. government's founding charter. The Con-
stitution specifically states that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."' 33 These are the rules
by which the political community constrained itself. The words do not
limit the application of this limit to citizens or persons inside of the
United States.
Certainly, the enclosed political community rationale makes sense only
if the U.S. political community passed the Bill of Rights to limit the enu-
merated powers granted to the government, but not to limit those powers
not granted to the government in the Constitution. To the enclosed polit-
ical community rationale, because the Constitution never explicitly grants
the federal government the power to restrict immigration, the Bill of
Rights do not constrain this power. But this assumption seems dubious.
"The constitutional fathers were ... men whose thinking had been influ-
enced by natural law theory.' 134 Because of the natural law ideological
background, the Bill of Rights represents a recognition of rights that pre-
cern the military necessity doctrine, the plenary power doctrine concerns those most help-
less in society-aliens. Further, American society refuses entrance to the aliens to which
the plenary power doctrine applies. In contrast, the military necessity doctrine can affect
U.S. citizens. Even if among the more helpless members of the United States, citizens can
critique the military necessity doctrine after the fact. Thus, if citizens, after having their
rights violated because of military necessity, debunk the military necessity principle as non-
sense, military necessity cases undermine the Court's legacy. Cf Geoffrey R. Stone, Na-
tional Security v. Civil Liberties, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2203, 2209 (2007) ("The Justices are
acutely aware of the Court's past failures, and no Justice wants his or her legacy to be
tainted by the next Schenck, Korematsu, or Dennis."). This likely forces the Justices to
scrutinize the government's use of the military necessity doctrine. Id. The removed aliens,
by contrast, cannot participate in U.S. democracy and attack the legacy of the court.
Therefore, the Court has no impetus to scrutinize the plenary power doctrine.
131. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 607.
132. See PETER C. MEILAENDER, TOWARD A THEORY OF IMMIGRATION (2001) (argu-
ing that positions taken by countries on immigration relate to the underlying views of the
political community).
133. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
134. Richard F. Hahn, Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 957, 972 (1982) (asserting a broad interpretation of the Bill of Rights
under the philosophical implications of natural law). "Properly understood, the Bill [of
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date government and rights that all individuals hold. 135 The Bill of
Rights, then, limits all of our government's actions. These limitations
constrain our officials. "[T]he Supreme Court has held that the Bill of
Rights applies to foreign as well as domestic affairs, in war as in peace, to
aliens as well as to citizens, abroad as well as home."' 36
As a political community, the U.S. citizenry limited the powers of its
government. Therefore, if the political community wished to indefinitely
detain aliens, it should not have granted all persons due process rights.
B. The Need for Critical Race Theory
As discussed above, the government, the population, and businesses
have used immigration to obtain cheap labor when necessary and discard
the cheap labor when the economy sputters. Historically, the govern-
ment discarded the cheap labor in racist, nativist terms. These actions
show how the plenary power doctrine harms. But, while discarding the
plenary power doctrine might prevent the government from passing an-
other version of the Chinese Exclusion Act, "the modern immigration
laws for the most part are facially race-neutral.' 13' And, under the stan-
dard imposed by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, a law vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause only if the law intends to discriminate
on the basis of race.138
Rights] is not an affirmative grant of rights, but simply an explicit recognition of those
rights retained by the individual." Id.
135. See id. (implying that the rights asserted in the Constitution pre-date the execu-
tion of the document). "[T]he Supreme Court's opinions reflect this conception of the Bill
of Rights and its scope. Aside from exclusion and deportation cases, the Court has never
refused to balance individual rights against exercises of the government's foreign affairs
power." Id. at 973.
136. Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chi-
nese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 863 (1987).
137. Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law
in the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
525, 532. "Despite the faqade of neutrality, these laws have unmistakably disparate im-
pacts on immigrants of color from developing nations." Id.; see George A. Martfnez, Race
and Immigration Law: A Paradigm Shift?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 517, 518 ("[I]t takes some
effort to decode apparently race-neutral immigration laws to reveal their hidden racial
implications.").
138. 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976) (describing the necessary elements that must be pre-
sent in order for a law to violate the Equal Protection Clause). The Supreme Court has
historically adhered to the principal that in order to be racially discriminatory, a law must
"ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." Id. at 240.
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Although the analysis above highlights the weakness of the Supreme
Court's plenary power logic, it cannot, alone, overcome the problems
raised in immigration law.1 39 One author elaborates as to this conflict:
The solution to the human rights problems created by the exercise of
plenary power is often presumed to be the extension of full constitu-
tional protections to the subject groups; in other words, the assimila-
tion of the Other [non-citizens] into the mainstream of the body
politic. The legal system nominally took this route with respect to
African-Americans, over whom complete plenary power was author-
ized by law until the Reconstruction amendments. However, as
Judge Higginbotham and many other scholars have documented, for-
mal legal equality has not for the most part resulted in the actual
protection of African-American human rights.14°
The same criticism exists against any doctrinal change in the plenary
power doctrine. Given Washington, even a dramatic shift in doctrine
would likely give the government enough room to discriminate on race or
national origin.
Critical Race Theory applies in this situation. "Critical Race theorists
strive to dislodge the elements of race and racial power entrenched in
doctrinal categories."' 41 CRT can especially enlighten in the immigration
context. 42 CRT offers at least two useful tools. CRT offers insight into
"racism" beyond that offered by intentional discrimination. As such,
CRT fights to overturn Washington. Further, CRT, through White privi-
lege, can attempt to limit how the political community decides to define
139. For criticism of Washington's intent requirement, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of
"Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 36-40, 43-47 (1991), which distin-
guishes between formal race, status race, and historical race and argues that formal race
strict scrutiny undermines the government's efforts to end systemic discrimination; and
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323, 328-40 (1987), which argues that the intent
requirement ignores the effect systematic and cultural notions of race play on individuals'
consciousness.
140. Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power Over the "Other": Indians, Immi-
grants, Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International
Law, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 427, 432 (2002).
141. Anthony V. Alfieri, Black and White, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 561, 579 (1998) (review-
ing CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995)).
142. See generally Stephen Shie-Wei Fan, Note, Immigration Law and the Promise of
Critical Race Theory: Opening the Academy to the Voices of Aliens and Immigrants, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1202 (1997) (espousing the importance of taking a Critical Race Theory
approach to the problems raised by immigration law). "[C]ontemporary immigration and
alienage law is largely bound by the issues of race, and reasons that immigration scholars
could better account for the complex intersections of race, alienage, and other identity
characteristics ...." Id.
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itself. Specifically, in the immigration context, the U.S. political commu-
nity has the analogy of White privilege. The community obtains privilege
from its abuse of the immigration system, but then assumes no privilege
exists.
Washington fails to understand racism. Racism is a product of soci-
ety,143 not of individuals. By placing the focus on intent, the Court ig-
nores unconscious racist impulses. Every member of society has racist
tendencies gained by cultural assimilation. "Even if a child is not told
that [B]lacks are inferior, he learns that lesson by observing the behavior
of others.""' The constant stigmatizing of aliens makes it seem normal
to stigmatize aliens. Society's failure to recognize accomplishments by
aliens diminishes their role in improving the United States. Because of
Washington, society creates discriminatory outcomes without any expla-
nation for the outcome. No one intentionally discriminated, so society
assumes racism played no role in the allocation of results.
Take, for example, the exodus from Haiti in the early 1980s. The law
grants the Attorney General wide discretion in granting aliens parole.14 5
The Attorney General's discretion, in light of Washington, makes it im-
possible to prove intentional discrimination. Consequently, the Haitians
who arrived in the United States in the early 1980s faced discrimina-
tion.146 Yet, no government official sat behind a desk and intentionally
143. See Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 1659, 1659 (1995) (discussing how segregation is both a "cause and a product" of
American society). "The concept of race has no natural truth, no core content or meaning
other than those meanings created in a social system of White privilege and racist domina-
tion." Id.
144. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 135, 323 (1987).
145. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2006). Parole frees the alien from detention with-
out legally admitting the alien to the United States.
The Attorney General may, except as provided in subparagraph (B) or in section
1184(f) of this title, in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under
such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanita-
rian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the
United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of
the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney
General, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the cus-
tody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with
in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.
Id.
146. See Richard F. Hahn, Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens,
82 COLUM. L. REv. 957, 991 (1982). Whereas other groups were allowed to enter the
country under parole, Haitians where denied upon arrival. Id. "[T]he INS has denied
Haitian asylum claims virtually en masse. Earlier groups met with far more generous treat-
ment." Id.
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decided to discriminate against Haitian aliens. Nonetheless, race likely
played a role in governmental officials' decisions.147
Created by Washington and current Equal Protection Clause jurispru-
dence, this discrepancy represents an incorrect assumption about reality.
Although intentional discrimination constitutes a heinous act, discrimina-
tion far exceeds the narrow boundaries of intentional discrimination.
CRT can underscore this truth and topple the Washington analysis.
Moreover, given the interest-convergence principle and its corollary,
the idea that the majority will stop discriminating, exploiting, and harass-
ing aliens lacks substance. Like the transparency phenomenon, whereby
Whites never notice that they too have color and stereotypical character-
istics attributed to them because of their color,14 8 the political-community
argument ignores privilege. The U.S. population carries undeniable privi-
lege, and part of this privilege came from its usage of cheap labor in the
form of immigration. Nonetheless, the political community argument as-
sumes the status quo to be untethered from the past. Thus, the U.S. citi-
zenry can mold, shape, and control immigration in whatever way it seeks,
for the citizenry has the right to define who can be part of the political
community.
Simply because the citizenry cannot see its privilege, it does not follow
that the privilege does not exist.' 4 9 "One of the eternal conflicts out of
which life is made up is that between the effort of every man to get the
most he can for his services, and that of society, disguised under the name
of capital, to get his services for the least possible return."' 5 ° The citi-
zenry, under the plenary power doctrine, has obtained cheap labor when
necessary throughout the United States' history, thereby getting services
for the least possible return. Whenever the immigration threatened the
efforts of the elite to get the most for their services, they closed the immi-
gration doors.
147. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV., 317, 330 (1987) (stating that "[r]acism is in
large part a product of the unconscious."). "It arises from the assumptions we have
learned to make about the world, ourselves, and others as well as from the patterns of our
fundamental social activities." Id. "We attach significance to race even when we are not
aware we are doing so." Id.
148. See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957 (1993) ("The
most striking characteristic of Whites' consciousness of whiteness is that most of the time
we don't have any."); Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659, 1659 (1995) ("Whites have difficulty perceiving Whiteness, both
because of its cultural prevalence and because of its cultural dominance.").
149. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1710-14
(1993) (discussing the benefits of Whiteness gained by unknowing Whites).
150. Vegelahn v. Gutner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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This privilege likely makes any doctrinal change unreliable. A doctri-
nal shift, even if seismic, likely will not cure any true discrimination faced
by incoming aliens. Washington exemplifies White privilege. 151 Thus,
even if the courts replace the plenary power doctrine with some other
more lenient doctrine, CRT must play a critical role. By comparing the
privilege gained by the citizenry from immigration law with the White
privilege gained by Whites, CRT can, again, undermine the plenary
power doctrine. By dispelling "the idea that immigration policies have
nothing to do with race," '52 CRT can play a major role in reshaping im-
migration law's future.
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts, via the plenary power doctrine, have shirked their responsi-
bility to uphold the Constitution. Still, as this Note has shown, the courts
never needed to do such a thing. The courts' reasoning behind the ple-
nary power doctrine lacks substance and coherency.
The doctrine's alleged father, international law, would now limit its
scope. Because the Supreme Court, over 100 years ago, scribbled the
international law of that time on paper, courts cannot impose interna-
tional law's current restrictions upon the doctrine. Furthermore, the na-
tional security rationale lacks coherency. Even in cases of alleged
terrorism, the courts have applied the Constitution to the political
branches of government. Where the United States has, at least, a prima
facie case for invoking national security interests, the courts imposes con-
stitutional limits on the political branches. In contrast, where a wide, hor-
rid history of discrimination that lacks any national security concerns
appears, the courts dogmatically refuse to apply the Constitution upon
the political branches.
Furthermore, Washington undermines a doctrinal solution to the ple-
nary power doctrine. Nonetheless, some doctrinal solutions may apply.
The Court, like in Hamdi, can apply the Mathews balancing test to aliens.
At the very least, this removes the possibility of indefinite detention,
since the Court has recognized freedom from detention as the elemental
liberty interest.153 No one claims the Mathews balancing test the apothe-
osis of rights protection. Under the Mathews balancing test, courts bal-
151. See Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REV.
603, 618 (1999) ("Our anti-discrimination law itself embodies a form of White privilege.").
152. Ruben J. Garcia, Comment, Critical Race Theory and Proposition 187: The Ra-
cial Politics of Immigration Law, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 118, 143 (1995).
153. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (showing the Court's reliance on previous decisions
denying the government the ability to hold people for an undisclosed, undetermined
amount of time).
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ance three factors: (1) the individual right at stake, (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation of the right and the value of extra safeguards, and(3) the state interest. 54 Since the balance places the right of one individ-
ual against the collective interest of the state, individuals have few hopes
of winning any concrete procedural safeguards.' 55 Besides token addi-
tional safeguards or extreme circumstances, few situations exist where the
right of an individual overcomes the burdens placed on society as to de-
mand substantial procedural safeguards. These risks exponentially in-
crease when courts must balance the burdens of the U.S. political
community with the rights of aliens. History shows that the United
States' public quickly and easily disregards aliens' rights. Thus, Mathews,
applied to aliens, might give some aid to aliens, but Mathews does not
suffice.
Doctrinally, another approach offers a solution. The Supreme Court
has shown the mettle to strike down laws stemming from hate. Three
cases exemplify this approach. For example, in Reitman v. Mulkey, Cali-
fornia passed an amendment to its constitution that barred the state gov-
ernment from prohibiting racial discrimination in the housing market.'56
The Supreme Court struck down the amendment as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment."' Similarly, Romer v. Evans concerned a Colo-
rado constitutional amendment that prevented local governments from
passing laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation.'58
The Court struck down the amendment. 5 9 Lastly, in Plyler v. Doe, Texas
154. E.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
155. See, e.g., Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1351 (7th Cir. 1997)(applying a cost-benefit analysis to procedural safeguards). Judge Posner gives us an exem-
plary interplay of the state interest against the interest of an individual. Id. In Van
Harken, Posner noted that, to produce extra safeguards in traffic violation cases, Chicago
needed the equivalent of sixty-seven extra full-time police officers. Id. Posner found the
individual rights could not overcome such a high toll on the city. Id. at 1352.
156. 387 U.S. 369, 370-374 (1967).
157. Id.
158. 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996). The law challenged in the case was known as
Amendment 2, the designation it was given when it was submitted to Colorado voters. Id.
at 623. Amendment 2 prohibited "all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of
state or local government" that was designed to protect homosexuals. Id. at 624.
159. Id. at 626. The Court held that Amendment 2 violated the Equal ProtectionClause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the state had no legitimate interest. Id. at635. Amendment 2 denied homosexual's legal protection from discrimination, and it pro-hibited restoration of protective laws and policies. Id. at 627. As a result, Amendment 2
classified homosexuals not in furtherance of a state interest but to make homosexuals une-
qual to everyone else. Id. at 635.
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denied undocumented aliens' children free public education. 6 ' The
Court concluded "that the illegal aliens ... in these cases may claim the
benefit of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protec-
tion"'161 and struck down the Texas law as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 6 ' While complex cases, the cases do have a unifying
theme: Courts will strike down laws and amendments to state constitu-
tions that harass groups because of animosity.1 63 Therefore, if the ple-
nary power doctrine dies, the courts might strike down immigration laws
based upon animosity. Nevertheless, the Court rarely uses the anti-ani-
mosity principle that links Reitman, Romer, and Plyler.
In reality, the only possible hope to overcome the abuses faced by
aliens is to highlight the abuses faced by aliens. Only when courts and the
public understand that this nation mistreats aliens will aliens receive a
modicum of justice. Thus, advocates must teach the immigration analogy
of "White privilege" and fully explicate the interest-convergence princi-
ple. The struggle to end discrimination against aliens also needs the end
of discrimination against other discriminated groups. 164  Washington's
simplistic view of racism must also fall.
In short, the plenary power doctrine cements a racist, nativist structure
whereby the political branches can advantageously increase cheap labor
when U.S. society needs cheap goods. However, when the economy de-
clines, the government simply enforces its immigration laws and removes
the aliens. Because of the plenary power doctrine, advocates for aliens
have few options. Advocates can make moral claims for immigration re-
form165 or can make arguments based on national self-interest,'166 but this
160. 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982). The Texas legislature revised its education laws in May
1975 to prohibit school districts from receiving state funds to educate children of undocu-
mented aliens and to allow the school districts to deny these children enrollment. Id.
161. Id. at 215.
162. Id. at 230.
163. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free
Exercise, and the (Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1189, 1264-65
(2008) (discussing the Court's anti-bias motivation in Plyler and Romer). "[T]he Supreme
Court has required the government to offer the actual reason for the enactment and to
establish that the government's purpose was actually advanced by the application of the
law on the facts presented." Id. at 1265.
164. See Francisco Valdes, Outsider Scholars, Critical Race Theory, and "OutCrit" Per-
spectivity: Postsubordination Vision as Jurisprudential Method, in CROSSROADS, DiREc-
TIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 399, 399 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002)
(urging coalitions of "OutCrit" scholars to reach a post subordination world).
165. See, e.g., BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND
IMMIGRATION POLICY 164-215 (2006) (arguing that the United States should consider the
moral consequences of its immigration policies).
166. See, e.g., Freddy Funes, Note, Removal of Central American Gang Members:
How Immigration Laws Fail to Reflect Global Reality, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 301 (2008)
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constitutes an unnecessary approach. The Constitution should apply to
aliens. And, although this application to aliens leads to minimum relief,
the relief is a victory. Beyond protection from the United States Consti-
tution, advocates should embrace the tools given by Critical Race Theory.
When they do, a long struggle will follow-overturning Washington and
overcoming formalistic notions of "equality" will not come easily. But, at
least, a tangible struggle there will be.
(arguing that the United States' massive removal of gang members to Central America
harms the United States' interest).
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